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International Law in Relation to
Private Law Practice*
FREDERIc

R. .COUDERTt

There is a current notion, or, perhaps I should say a fancy, not
wholly confined to layman that "international law" is a misnomer.
The underlying thought appears to be that, as there is not an international sheriff who can beckon to a posse comitagus to enforce the
final judgment of some court possessed of statutory jurisdiction,
international law so-called is not really law.
One has occasionally noted the smile of a sarcastic friend in emphasizing the word "international" prefixed to lawyer. The smile
may be kindly, but the thought is that the phrase is a contradiction in
term. This is an attitude not uncommon and perhaps quite natural
among the brethren of the bar who have never had to perplex their
heads with questions of international law which had found their way
into the law courts, and whose information was derived from the
newspapers.
It is gratifying to find that in the law schools we have passed
beyond this phase, and international public law as well as private
law, (or conflict of laws), is now taught as part of the ordinary curriculum.
A quarter of a century ago, and, in fact, until quite recently,
neither constitutional nor administrative law were looked upon as
worthy of treatment in the schools of law. Law was confined to
contracts, real property, equity, and the general matters which the
ordinary country lawyer treated for a living and which alone were
deemed sufficiently important to occupy the attention of technical
schools.

To the School of Political Science at Columbia University, founded
in i88o, and composed of a group of original thinkers and men of
vast erudition, is largely due the credit of having insisted that public
law was law in the wide and full sense of the term, and that to understand and apply it were needed the qualifications of the trained legal
mind. The popular notion is, therefore, a mere survival of another
age; it can easily be explained in the light of history.
*Of the New York bar.
tA lecture delivered at the Cornell Law School, under the Frank Irvine Lectureship of the Phi Delta Phi Foundation, May eighth, nineteen hundred and
twenty-six.
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International law is a recent growth and began with the rise of the
national States upon the ruins of the old concept of universal empire.
It was due largely to Grotius and to eminent successors who stressed
international morality and the law of nature rather than treaties or
judicial precedents of which there were so few.
The teachers of public law on the continent for many generations
were men of academic minds whose thoughts ran upon general
political or philosophic concepts and who were remote from the
forum. International arbitrations were comparatively rare until the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century.
Since then international law has developed so that today it is as
much a thing of legal reasoning, of precedent and of juristic analysis
as the law of tort or contract. This has been demonstrated with
complete finality by a living jurist to whom the world owes a profound debt. I refer to John Bassett Moore, Judge of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.
To the mind of John Bassett Moore, a man accustomed to dealing
with questions between nations, and familiar with the history of international relations, counsel in various cases before international
tribunals, the Austinian view of international law was not only false
but misleading and destructive. For a generation he preached the
doctrine that international law was as truly law as was constitutional
law; that its uncertainties, its problems and its perplexities were due,
not to its lack of sanction, but to those factors which made for uncertainty in every branch of law-the rapidly moving and changing
tide of human development.
To him the idea that national States existed without subjection to
law, that wrongs to the individual which would have constituted
crimes, torts or breach of contract in municipal law, were without
legal redress was not only abhorrent, but absurd. Instead of dealing
with the matter by philosophic generalization, by subtle argument, or
by sterile controversy, he undertook, alone, the work of compiling a
real corpus juris of international law. This great work was begun by
the writing of seven volumes, recounting in all necessary, useful and
interesting detail the great body of controversies to which the United
States had been a party and which had been settled before arbitral
tribunals in accordance with law. (Moore's International Arbitrations.)
I think that this work may be said to have been a real revelation
even to the educated lawyer and diplomat. It demonstrated that
every form of controversy, from that of national boundaries to torts
committed against the humblest individual, had been satisfactorily
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disposed of before tribunals administering definite rules of law in the
same prosaic fashion as that applied by municipal courts. Questions
between Great Britain and the United States, as appealing to bellicose instincts as any arising between nations, were, in the end, submitted to bodies of jurists who, after interminable written and sometimes oral arguments by venerable lawyers, disposed of them in
accordance with the accepted canons of international law.
Nearly every one of these decisions, it was shown, had created an
additional precedent, a new starting-point, a further advance toward
certainty, clarity and justice in the law. Years of international
friction, diplomatic wrangling, phrase-making and oratory were
brought to an end by the Bering Sea Arbitration. Boasted sovereignty over closed oceans, threatened and actual seizures of ships
upon the high seas, with all the concomitant stimulation of national
sentiment, ended in legal arguments of interminable length through
warm summer days before an intelligent, though somewhat somnolent Arbitrable Tribunal in Paris. The result was that the questions raised with such vehemence and discussed with such acrimony
are now quite forgotten save by the occasional historian or international lawyer.
All these things were demonstrated by Judge Moore in two monumental works in undramatic fashion and with a conclusiveness that
foreclosed discussion or academic refutation.
The World War did not invalidate, but on the contrary, it inmensely emphasized the importance of international law. In consequence
of the Versailles Treaty and of our own Treaty with Germany, the
Berlin Treaty so-called, mixed arbitral tribunals have been established
as a necessary part of the peace adjustment and have in accordance with principles of law disposed of thousands of cases in the same
fashion as would have been done by the House of Lords, the Privy
Council or the Supreme Court of the United States.
Throughout the war the newspapers were daily filled with the
questions of the applicability of the Hague Treaty Conventions, the
legality of the allied blockade, contraband lists, the doctrine of continuous voyage and ultimate destination, as well as kindred matters.
These questions could no more be fully understood without a knowledge of the history of international law than could questions of
equitable jurisprudence be comprehended by one without the necessary training. Sooner or later every one of these great questions
must and will come before a court, either a court constituted ad
hoc, or the Permanent Court now functioning at the Hague. The
cases will be argued by lawyers upon definite pleadings and upon.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
testimony taken under fixed rules. The lawyer whowas not conversant
with litigation or who had no training in the proper presentation of a
,.ase would find himself as much at a loss before an international
-ribunal as he would before the Circuit Court of Appeals.
It was long ago held by Chief Justice Marshall that international
law was part of our common law, and the Supreme Court has always been a great international tribunal not only because it decided
controversies between States, but also because there are constantly
arising in litigation questions dependent purely upon principles of
international law.
I shall give, merely by way of example and in order to fix and
emphasize these somewhat general statements, a rapid survey of a
few cases that have come to me in the course of a general and miscellaneous law practice. These cases will, I think, justify theproposition that there is nothing occult, mysterious or abnormal about international law. They may also be useful to the man who thinks
that international law is of so lofty and perhaps spiritual or intellectual a nature that the so-called international lawyer may dispense
with the drudgery incident to the making of any other kind of a
lawyer. I have known many other lawyers, both in this and in
other countries, whose practice had given them some reputation
as international lawyers, and I have never known one who would
not have been considered by every canon of capacity an able lawyer
in the fullest sense of the word. The academic dreamer and the
mere philosopher are as helpless in the determination of international legal problems as they would be in the conduct of a law
office in the State of New York.
My first contact with important international controversy was
when as still a student in the law school I accompanied my father to
Paris where he went with several colleagues to represent the United
States in the Fur Seal Arbitration with Great Britain.
The counsel on both sides were men who had spent their lives in
the ordinary law courts of their respective nations.
England sent Sir Charles Russell, then Attorney General, later
Lord Chief Justice, under the title of Earl of Killowen, and Sir
Richard Webster, former Attorney General, later Lord Chief Justice,
under the title of Lord Alverstone. With them was associated Sir
Christopher Robinson, a most able Canadian barrister, whose life
had been spent in the hard-fought contests of the forum.
America sent four seniors, one of them Mr. E. J. Phelps, a former
Ambassador to England, who had achieved distinction in the courts
of his native State, Vermont, and later was known as a lawyer
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throughout the nation. Mr. James C. Carter, who had never occupied public office, but who was recognized as a great lawyer, not
only in his own State of New York, but throughout the Union, and
especially in the Supreme Court where he had had a large practice;
Judge Blodgett, of Chicago, a well known lawyer of general practice,
and my father who had for well nigh half a century practiced almost
every kind of law.
On both sides there were associated juniors, some of whom have
since risen to great eminence, like former Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing.
The questions dealt with were of wide scope, the interpretation of
history, the meaning of diplomatic documents, and, finally, the fundamental nature of property, mainly as determined by precedents
found in England and in America. The court was empowered to
determine the facts, and in so doing was compelled to scrutinize
thousands of pages of evidence. Arguments lasted for several months
in which every resource of the lawyer from rhetoric to research was
exhausted.
If I had ever cherished any illusions as to the exceptional nature of
international law they would have been shattered then and there.
The tribunal was exceptional in that it was composed of seven
jurists and lawyers of great eminence, an English Judge and an
American Judge among them; the proceedings were conducted with
rigid adherence to judicial forms. When Mr. Carter closed an argument of eight days' length, in which he had upon repeated occasions
referred to the law of nature, Sir Charles Russell, in opening cited the
anecdote of the young barrister who finding his case insufficiently
buttressed by authority referred to the Great Book of Nature, upon
which the presiding Justice interrupted to ask, "What page, and
what edition, please?"
The case was ultimately decided in its main elements, contrary to
the contentions of the United States, but I think in conformity with
settled principles of property law as developed in England and
America.
Of course, most international questions presenting themselves to
the practitioner do not come to him in so spectacular and exceptional
a fashion.
A client is arrested for an alleged crime; he finds that the client
holds some official position in a foreign Government, and he asks
himself whether this may not change the nature of the prosecution,
or render the client immune from the action of the ordinary courts.
My first contact with the Supreme Court arose out of an arrest in
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February, 1897, in New York, of an American citizen who was invested with the office of Consul of Turkey in Boston, (Iasigiv. Van
De Carr, 166 U. S. 391). He applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that under the Constitution of the United States he could not
be prosecuted other than in the Federal courts. This very salutary
clause of the Constitution is, of course, predicated upon the general
principles of international law giving to the representatives of a
foreign nation peculiar privileges, and, in the case of Ministers or
Ambassadors, complete immunity from suit.
The question in this case while argued at full length before the
court, was rendered moot by the action of the Secretary of State in
revoking the consular exequatur and thus depriving the gentleman of
his consular position and rendering him subject to the process of the
courts of Massachusetts and hence extraditable from New York to
that State.
The intervention of the executive thus spoiled an interesting case
which instead of becoming a precedent on a matter of public law is
now merely cited on a narrow point of procedure in connection with
the writ of habeas corpus.
Questions relating to consuls, their powers, duties and privileges
under treaties and in accordance with international law, frequently
find their way into the courts. The Supreme Court has been called
upon to pass on the question as to how far a treaty, giving certain
rights to consuls in the administration of estates of their nationals,
may supersede a State statute devolving such functions upon a:
public administrator.
These cases, of which there are several in the higher courts of the
various States, as well as in the Supreme Court of the United States,
are dependent upon the interpretation of treaties and their effect upon
local law, as well as upon the history of consular rights and privileges
in connection with which the apposite provisions of the Treaty must
be read. (Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317.)
In everyday practice there may arise questions of interest and
importance to governments. I remember one case especially because of some picturesque accompaniments.
In E896 a Venezuelan General, bearing proudly the scars of war,
entered my office and told me with dignity and righteous indignation
that he had been arrested upon arrival in New York for assault and
battery because of something done by him in the course of a military
operation in Venezuela.
It turned out that after the taking of Ciudad Bolivar he found the
supply of water threatened because a certain Underhill, an American
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business man, also acting as consul in that city, was preparing to
leave the city and to abandon the contract under which he was operating the municipal waterworks. Gently imposing the military hand
upon him, the General insisted that he continue to operate, which he
did for some time under this gentle persuasion. Soon thereafter he
returned to his native city of Brooklyn, and, when a few years later
the General came to visit in quasi triumph the United States he was
arrested by a writ issued from the Supreme Court of the State in
connection with false imprisonment, assault and battery.
Normally, such a case would have presented the prosaic elements of
the usual tort action. By reason, however, of the circumstances
accompanying it, it has become an important precedent in our
American law. (Underhill v. Hernandez. T68 U. S. 250).
The court held that the General could not be tried in the judicial
forum because
"The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign
tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the exercise
of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of
governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact."
(Underhill v. Hernandez, supra, p. 252.)
Many American aid English cases were cited to that effect and the
case represents the settled law today on that subject.
The students will note, if they examine these two cases as they
proceeded through the courts, that various rather intricate questions
of procedure were involved and that they could only have been
dealt with by the lawyer familiar with common law practice and
principles.
International law is also used in the sense of international private
law, perhaps more properly called conflict of laws. This is now recognized to be a branch of our common law currently taught in the law
schools. It is, however, a specialty of high technical character involving such fundamental questions as status, marriage and divorce and
the effect of foreign judgments.
On the continent of Europe it has been treated in rather academic
fashion because the university law schools and writers on the theory
of law have an influence and an importance almost, if not quite,
equal to that of the courts. In this country any of these questions
may at any time confront the practicing lawyer. They are incidents
to a general practice and they are scarcely sufficiently numerous to
warrant any attempt at specialization, but they come up with
sufficient frequency, especially in our Union with its half a hundred
jurisdictions, to warrant every student in giving the closest attention

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
to a course in the Conflict of Laws. If he does not do so he may at
any time find himself sorely puzzled and of little use to a troubled
client.
To mention, however, further questions of international public
law, with which alone I am now dealing, it is difficult to pick from the
many interesting cases that arose after the Spanish War and more
especially after the Great War.
Of course the majority of such cases came before arbitral or special
tribunals, like the Court of Claims. Some of them found theirway
into the Supreme Court and were often accompanied by questions of
constitutional or administrative law.
The status of the Roman Catholic Church and its capacity for the
holding of property, under our Constitution, the Treaty of Paris and
in the light of its history and its relations with Spain, were given
fullest consideration in the case of Ponce v. The Roman Catholic
Church, (210 U. S. 296).
Questions of the power of the military over enemy property were
involved in cases like that of Diaz v. United States, (222 U. S. 574).
That case involved the limitation upon the powers of confiscation
and the Supreme Court there laid down important rules.
The case of Vilas v. The City of Manila (220 U. S. 345), which
came up regarding a suit over a coal bill for fuel furnished to the
city, involved the broad proposition of the continued corporate
survival of municipalities after a change of sovereignty.
The Great War involved innumerable questions that are only in
process of settlement. Some of them, however, have been already
disposed of by our courts, such as the case of the steamship "Appam."
This was an interesting case and in its solution we harkened back to
our earliest judicial precedents as to neutrality and prize.
The cruiser "Moewe" escaping through the network of British
blockading vessels in the North Sea, roamed about the world seeking
whom it might devour. It captured the "Appam" a fine passenger
and freight vessel in the West African service, and, fearing for her
recapture, a crew was detailed to send her to Newport News as
prize and there "lay her up" for the continuance of the war.
The American people were rather startled to learn of the arrival of
this vessel and of the German contention that under an old Treaty
of 1799 power was given to Germany to use ports of the United
States for the harboring of prize vessels.
A considerable diplomatic controversy ensued, but the controversy was soon translated to the judicial forum when the original
owners of the vessel libeled it in a replevin action.
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The case was tried at Norfolk, Virginia, and a decree given in
favor of the libelants. An appeal was taken by the German Government on behalf of the vessel to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Most interesting questions not only of treaty interpretation
but of the right to use neutral ports under the general rules of international law in time of war were argued. The further question of
whether there remained any outstanding right in the original owners
after the capture was also presented (spes recuperandi). Every
known precedent from the earliest developments of international
law was adduced. Analogies from the Roman law were applied and
the court in a unanimous decision finally held that the vessel had
violated our neutrality laws, and the complete title, not having
passed by any decree of a prize court, the vessel must therefore be
restored to her owners, the German right to possession having been
forfeited by violation of American neutrality. (S. S. Appam, 243
U. S. 124).

During the war, it became the practice of foreign Governments to
take over merchant ships and to commission them to go about the
world carrying supplies or conducting what ordinarily would have
been a regular business. This continued until long after the termination of hostilities. In many ways and under diverse procedures
the question arose as to the liability of these ships and how far, if at
all, they were subject to the ordinary processes of the court. (See the
Muir Case, 254 U. S. 522, and others including the S. S. Western
Maid, 257 U. S. 419).
This question, despite numerous adjudications, calls for some
general international agreement. The courts of the United States
and of England have held generally that if the vessels were operated
by the Government they were akin to public vessels and not subject
to ordinary process. There must however, be found some limitation
to the extension of this rule, especially as Governments are tending
more and more to embark upon what was once considered private
business. Questions of this kind, however, may still come before
the ordinary practitioner, and more particularly before those who
practice in admiralty.
There arose recently in our Federal courts, as a result of the Great
War, a most interesting case involving questions both of private and
of public international law.
The British Public Trustee, appointed under British statutes to
act as Alien Property Custodian, took possession of large blocks of
certificates of stock in American corporations owned at the outbreak
of the war by German corporations or individuals. These certifi-
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cates of stock were endorsed in blank and were physically situate in
England where they had been dealt in. Subsequent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, the Public Trustee requested
transfers from the American corporations to his nominees. These
transfers were refused by the American corporations because of
'demands filed with them by the former German owners. The latter
claimed that the seizure of the certificates did not transfer the title of
the stock which was an intangible thing situated in legal contemplation
at the domicile of the corporation.
The Public Trustee contended,
(i) That endorsed securities were the equivalent of bearer
securities and were in the nature of chattels, all the rights evidenced by the certificates being, by modem law, merged in the
documents themselves, and,
(2) That the seizure had been ratified by the German authorities by specific provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
The older authorities appeared to indicate the plausibility of the
German view. The more recent authorities, however, in the United
States, in accordance with modem commercial usage, held that the
certificates so endorsed were in themselves property subject to the
jurisdiction of the authorities in the territory where situated.
The case was decided by the United States District Court in favor
of the British Public Trustee, (Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel
Corporation,300 Fed. Rep. 741), and this decision was affirned by
the Supreme Court in a brief but sweeping opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes, (267 U. S. 22). The doctrine that the documents themselves were not only evidence of the ownership of the shares, but that
the rights of ownership were merged in them was categorically
adopted. The British authorities had jurisdiction over them and
were able to pass title in accordance with the settled rules as to
jurisdiction over things.
Thus the more modem view has become the law of the landanother clear instance of the evolution and development of legal
principles in accordance with custom, usage and changing needs of
society.
The questions as to the effect of the Versailles Treaty, although
fully argued, were not passed upon by the court as they had become
unnecessary in view of the sweeping decision as to the nature of the
stock certificates.
New statutes dealing with ship and seamen's rights, such as the
Jones Act, have given rise to considerable litigation, as has the
Eighteenth Amendment, and the treaties extending the three mile
limit. (Strathearn case, 252 U. S. 348, and Cunard S. S. Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U. S.

1oo.)
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How far can the courts refuse to regard contracts made abroad, or
payments of advance wages in countries where such is the law and
the custom? Should these statutes be so construed? In how far are
they constitutional, and in their construction how far should the
court go in considering their anomalous nature and the injury done
by such construction to foreign nations?
All these cases involve legal reasoning and a knowledge of precedents drawn from almost every department of the law. They can
only be dealt with by trained lawyers who have had general experience and a wide practice. Over-specialization is a dangerous thing;
it often prevents a catholicity of view and a breadth of concept.
The international lawyer should be, in the first place, a sound discriminating and highly educated man. With that qualification he
may readily adapt himself, if opportunity presents, to specialize
in those cases which present international aspects, but in so doing he
must be prepared to keep in contact with the general current of the
law, for there are no watertight compartments, and international
law and general private law are too closely related to permit a
practitioner in any one sphere to ignore developments in another.
The progress of international law is due to lawyers, not to philosophers or moralists. A knowledge of international law is a necessary
part of the equipment of any American lawyer, first, that he may
fulfill his role in the community as a good citizen and as a member of
the profession, and, second, that he may properly safeguard the
interests of his client.
The law schools of this country have done much for the scientific
development of municipal law. They have taken a similar place to
the great university schools of jurisprudence on the continent of
Europe. They can now do much for international law at a time
when world peace and progress can only be attained through international co-operation based upon international law.
Wars can never be averted where they are the only alternative to
real or supposed injustice. The creation of the World Court marks a
turning point in history and is a great triumph for the lawyer class to
whom the world so largely looks to substitute legal justice for armed
force.

